Continuous Variable one-way and controlled-two-way secure direct quantum communication schemes have been designed using Gaussian states. Specifically, a scheme for continuous variable quantum secure direct communication and another scheme for continuous variable controlled quantum dialogue are proposed using single-mode squeezed coherent states. The security of the proposed schemes against a set of attacks (e.g., Gaussian quantum cloning machine and intercept resend attacks) has been proved. Further, it is established that the proposed schemes do not require two-mode squeezed states which are essential for a set of existing proposals. The controlled two-way communication scheme is shown to be very general in nature as it can be reduced to schemes for various relatively simpler cryptographic tasks like controlled deterministic secure communication, quantum dialogue, quantum key distribution. In addition, it is briefly discussed that the proposed schemes can provide us tools to design quantum cryptographic solutions for several socioeconomic problems. * srikara.s@students.iiserpune.ac.in
Introduction
The advantages of quantum resources and principles of quantum mechanics in the field of quantum technology are the focus of the second quantum revolution [1] . The first set of applications of quantum mechanics was proposed in secure quantum communication with the feasibility of a quantum key distribution protocol [2] , where security does not rely on the complexity of the computational task. This was followed by several quantum key distribution and other cryptographic schemes (see [3] [4] [5] for review). Specifically, quantum resources ensure secure transmission of a message without requiring key transmission known as quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [6] [7] [8] and deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC) [9] . DSQC (QSDC) requires an (no) additional classical communication to decode the message [4, 9] . Bidirectional and controlled variants of these schemes have been proposed subsequently [10, 11] .
Independent of these initial discrete variable (DV) quantum cryptography schemes, a set of continuous variable (CV) secure quantum communication schemes have also been proposed. Information is encoded on quadratures in CV communication schemes. The encoded information is decoded later by homodyne or heterodyne detection (see [12] [13] [14] for review). Most of the initial CV cryptography schemes used Gaussian states, like squeezed [15, 16] , Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlated [17] , and coherent [18] [19] [20] states. However, schemes using non-Gaussian states have also been proposed since then ( [21] and references therein). CV quantum communication is preferred over corresponding DV counterpart due to the possibility of its implementation without requiring single photon source and/or detector, better performance for metropolitan networks which can be performed using existing optical communication technology.
Motivated by the advantages of CV communication in general, CV schemes are proposed recently for QSDC [22, 23] , DSQC [24] , quantum dialogue (QD) [25, 26] , multiparty QD [22, 27, 28] , controlled quantum dialogue (CQD) [29] . Several types of CV quantum key distribution schemes have also been designed ( [21] and references therein). Inspired by these works and our recent results [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] which established that several direct quantum communication schemes may be useful in providing quantum solutions to secure multiparty computation tasks [35] , here we propose a CV QSDC and a CV CQD schemes. Specifically, it is already established that several socioeconomic problems can be defined as secure multiparty computation tasks, such as voting [30] , sealed-bid auction [32] , socialist millionaire problem [29] , and private comparison [33] . In fact, some of the present authors have proposed a CV CQD scheme using two-mode squeezed state [29] and used it with α = 1.2 + i2.1. These plot are generated using [38] .
as primitive for quantum solution for the socialist millionaire problem. These works and the fact that single mode Gaussian states are easy to prepare, justify the need for designing new schemes for secure direct quantum communication using these states. In the rest of the paper, we have tried to design such schemes using squeezed coherent states. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic concepts of quantum optics required to explain the CV QSDC and CV CQD schemes (given in Section 3). In Section 4, we analyze the security of the proposed protocols. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Coherent states |α of the radiation field are the eigenstates of the annihilation operatorâ with a complex eigenvalue α, also called the amplitude of |α . A coherent state can also be described in terms of the displacement operator D(α) as [36] |α = D(α)|0 = e αâ † −α * â |0 .
Interestingly, the displacement operator acting on a coherent state would give another coherent state [36] D(β)|α = |β + α .
Further, an arbitrary quantum state ρ can also be described by a quasiprobability distribution in phase space, such as Wigner function [37] W (γ) = 1 π 2ˆd 2 z T r [ρD(z)] e −(zγ * −z * γ) .
It can be easily verified that the Wigner function of a coherent state |α is obtained as a Gaussian distribution peaked at γ = α (cf. Fig. 1 (a) ).
The real part q and the imaginary part p of the eigenvalue α = q + ip give values for the position and momentum quadratures, respectively. These quadratures can be measured by two methods, namely by homodyne and heterodyne detection. These methods are useful in quantum optical tomography, too [39, 40] . Homodyne detection is used to measure one of the quadratures, whereas heterodyne detection helps in measuring both the quadratures. However, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle restrict precise measurement of both the quadratures in heterodyne measurement. Additionally, the squeezing operator is defined as
where squeezing parameter s = re iθ . A coherent state gets squeezed after application of the squeezing operator which reduces the variance along one direction depending upon squeezing phase parameter at the cost of increase in variance in the perpendicular direction (cf. Fig. 1 (b) ). Therefore, α cannot be determined accurately using homodyne/heterodyne detection in the absence of knowledge about s. Note that the squeezing and displacement operators do not commute, and thus
where and α = β cosh(r) − e iθ β * sinh(r).
This brief description of the preliminaries, enables us to propose the protocols for CV QSDC and CV CQD that we aim to design in this work. The next section describes the protocols.
The protocols
Before we describe the cryptographic schemes we briefly discuss the encoding scheme. The encoding scheme is as follows:
The real line is divided into 8 parts: (-∞, -3), (−3, −2) , . . . , (i, i + 1) , . . . , (2, 3) , and (3, ∞). These parts represent the binary numbers 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110 and 111, respectively [25, 29] . The message is encoded by choosing a random real number r from the corresponding interval and applying the displacement operator D(β) on the incoming state where β = r + ir. Here it may be noted that the sender need not know which quadrature is squeezed. Consequently, she/he should encode the same message on both the quadratures.
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol
The QSDC protocol (shown schematically in Fig. 2 ) works as follows 5. Bob applies the corresponding S † (s j ) operator and performs homodyne measurement on the incoming n/2 message mode states for corresponding position or momentum quadrature. 6 . Alice sends information about the coordinates of the decoy states to Bob, and he checks for eavesdropping by comparing the corresponding α j values for the decoy states by following the same procedure as described in Step 3.
7. The measurement results from the remaining message mode states would reveal the message m A and hence Bob would obtain the message sent by Alice using Eq. (7).
Controlled quantum dialogue (CQD) protocol
The CQD protocol (shown schematically in Fig. 3 ) works as follows 1. Charlie generates 4n random complex numbers as a string R d and labels them γ 1 , γ 2 , ...., γ 4n . He then randomly generates 4n more complex numbers s 1 , s 2 , ...., s 4n as a string R s and uses both R d and R s to prepare the squeezed coherent states S(s j )D(γ j )|0 ∀j ∈ (1, . . . 4n) and sends them to Alice.
2. Alice, using an optical switch, randomly selects 2n of the incoming states as the control mode and sends the information about the coordinates of the 2n control mode states to Charlie, while she puts the rest of the 2n states into an optical delay for the message mode.
3. Charlie sends values of γ j and s j of the control mode states to Alice, and she applies the corresponding squeezing operator S † (s j ) = S(−s j ) to each of the control mode states to perform homodyne measurement of position/momentum quadrature on them. From the measured values she verifies the corresponding value γ j chosen by Charlie to check for eavesdropping. If γ j values are correct up to a tolerable limit, then she continues to the next step, else the protocol is aborted and they start all over again.
4. After discarding the control mode states, Alice encodes her message m A randomly in n of her message mode states by applying the appropriate displacement operator D(α j ) with α j = m A + i m A on them and leaves the other n states as control mode. Subsequently, she chooses a random complex number w j and squeezes all the 2n states by applying S(w j ) to these states and sends them to Bob. Upon Bob's confirmation of receiving all the 2n states, Alice sends Bob the value of w j and the coordinates of the control mode states and Charlie sends Bob their corresponding γ j and s j . Without loss of generality, we can assume w j = w∀j for squeezing operations would be sufficient in providing security against participant attack by Charlie.
5. Bob first applies the squeezing operator S † (w j ) = S(−w j ) on all the 2n received states and then applies the corresponding squeezing operators S † (s j ) on the n control mode states and checks for eavesdropping just as Step 3, meanwhile he encodes his message m B in the other n message modes by applying the appropriate displacement operator D(β j ) with β j = m B + i m B on them.
6. Once Bob encodes the message in the message mode states and confirms that there is no eavesdropping, then Charlie sends the corresponding γ j and s j of the message mode states, and Bob applies the corresponding operator D † (γ j )S † (s j ) on the message mode states. He measures position/momentum quadrature using homodyne detection and announces α j + β j after calculating it using Eq. (7) . Finally, Alice and Bob can obtain each other's message by subtracting their message from the announced value of α j + β j .
In the above, we have proposed CV protocols for QSDC and CQD, both of which are the schemes for secure direct quantum communication, but the former one enables one way secure direct communication whereas the later one allows the users to perform a two-way secure communication in presence of a controller. In what follows, the security of these schemes against various types of attacks will be critically analyzed.
Security analysis of the protocols
In this section, we discuss the security of the protocol with respect to two attacks, namely the Gaussian quantum cloning machine (GQCM) and intercept-resend attacks.
Gaussian quantum cloning machine (GQCM) attack
A GQCM consists of a linear amplifier of gain A and a beamsplitter of transmission coefficient T . The outputs of the GQCM are given in the Heisenberg picture as [26] 
and
where a B and a E are Bob's and Eve's copies, respectively. Further, a in is the incoming Alice's signal mode, and b 1 and b 2 are vacuum modes as inputs of the linear amplifier and the beamsplitter, respectively. We discuss the GQCM attack for the two protocols separately.
QSDC protocol
In the QSDC protocol given in Fig. 1 , the squeezing parameters s j and the initial coherent amplitudes α j are completely randomized and are kept secret by Bob throughout the protocol. Therefore, Eve cannot infer anything from her copy of the cloned state. Hence, the QSDC protocol is unconditionally secure against the GQCM attack.
CQD protocol
In the first quantum channel from Charlie to Alice, Eve has no advantage by performing this attack as Alice has not yet encoded her message. However though, in the quantum channel from Alice to Bob, Eve can use the GQCM on the channel and clone the incoming state, keep her copy of the clone in a quantum memory, wait for the values of w j , s j, α j + β j , and γ j to be announced during the protocol. She, subsequently, using this information, can measure her mode and interpret Alice's message which will reveal Bob's message too. Similarly, an untrusted Charlie may also perform the exact same attack. The input of the GQCM can be defined in Heisenberg picture as
where a = X a + iP a is the annihilation operator for the CV mode used for message transmission. Here, X a and P a correspond to the conjugate position and momentum quadrature operators, respectively. The final form of displacement and squeezing operators can be defined in terms of Alice's and Charlie's operations D(d j )S(t j ) = S(w)D(α j )S(s j )D(γ j ), where t j = s j + w j = ge ih , and d j = d jx + id jy can be obtained from α j and γ j using Eqs. (6) and (7). The use of Bogoliubov transformations yields a in = (mX a + d jx ) + i(nP a + d jy ) = X in + iP in ,
where X in = m r X a − n i P a + d jx , P in = m i X a + n r P a + d jy with m = cosh(g) − e ih sinh(g) = m r + im i , n = cosh(g) + e ih a † sinh(g) = n r + in i .
Using Eq. (11) as input of Eqs. (8) and (9), the position and momentum quadratures of the Bob's and Eve's modes can be obtained as
Since these variables are normally distributed, their corresponding variances are
where the parameters
are the respective signal variances, and
are the respective noise variances. If γ j is real (imaginary), then the position (momentum) quadrature is used for Homodyne measurement. Therefore, the mutual information I J (A, B) between Alice and Bob and I J (A, E) between Alice and Eve can be calculated as
with J ∈ {X, P } corresponding to the position and momentum quadrature measurements. The security criterion for the CQD protocol is
We further discuss the dependence of the security of the protocol on different parameters, such as squeezing parameters and cloning parameters (shown in Figs. 4-7) . According to Fig. 4 , we can clearly see that for ∆I J > 0 requires the transmission coefficient T > 0.5, and we also see that both ∆I X and ∆I P increases with an increase in T . Additionally, for T > 0.5, ∆I J decreases with increase in the gain parameter A as shown in Fig. 5 . In the case of T > 0.5, both ∆I X and ∆I P initially increase with increase in the value of squeezing parameter g and then decrease after reaching a maximum value of ∆I J . The effect of squeezing parameter g on position and momentum quadratures is opposite as ∆I P can be obtained from ∆I X by considering −g instead of g (cf. Figs. 6 and 7) . We have used h in the range 0 to π because according to Fig. 7 , the results are symmetric about h = π. 
Intercept-resend attack
In the QSDC protocol, Eve keeps the incoming state from Bob by using delay, and she prepares and sends her own freshly prepared state to Alice. Alice encodes her message on Eve's state and sends it to Bob. Eve decodes the message from this state, encodes the same message on Bob's state in the quantum memory and sends it back to Bob. This attack cannot be performed in this protocol because Eve will be detected when Alice checks for eavesdropping on the control mode, as α j values of those sent by Bob and those measured by Eve will not match. Another type of intercept-resend attack (which is a form of denial of service) can be performed by Eve in which she blocks the second channel (i.e., from Alice to Bob) and prepares and sends random quantum states to Bob, preventing Bob from receiving the message. This attack by Eve will be detected when Bob performs the eavesdropping checking on the decoy states in the message mode. In another kind of attack strategy, Eve measures the intercepted state, infers it, re-prepares it and sends it. This attack too, cannot be performed successfully by Eve as the squeezing parameter s j and the initial amplitude α j are random and unknown at the time of measurement, and hence no information can be obtained about the message sent. The same arguments hold for the CQD protocol.
Participant attack by Charlie
In CQD protocol, after Alice records her message and sends the encoded state to Bob. As Charlie is aware of the squeezing parameter, so he may intercept the Alice-Bob channel and apply S † operator to find out Alice's message. Subsequently, he re-prepares and re-sends the state to Bob. To avoid this, Alice has to apply her own random squeezing operation S(w j ) on the state after encoding her message. Here it may be noted that this attack is not applicable for the other scheme proposed here as there is no supervisor in that scheme.
Conclusion
Motivated by the recent success of CV quantum key distribution schemes using Gaussian states, we proposed here a two-party and a three-party CV direct secure Gaussian quantum communication schemes. Specifically, we have shown that a sender can send CV information to a distant receiver (in QSDC scheme) without distributing and encrypting it with a quantum key to attain security ensured by the quantum resources. A single-mode squeezed state is used as quantum resource, and displacement and squeezing operations are used to encode the message, which is decoded by performing homodyne detection. We have also proposed a continuous variable CQD which allows two parties to perform simultaneous communication under supervision of a controller in a secure manner. The proposed scheme can be reduced to thw corresponding threeparty scheme where a sender can send her message to the receiver by assuming that Bob is neither encoding his message nor announcing his final measurement outcomes in our CQD protocol. Both these schemes are found useful as primitive to design solutions for socio-economic problems, and thus the feasibility of our scheme with single mode Gaussian states enable us to provide continuous variable solutions for these problems. For instance, in one of our recent work [29] , we have used two-mode squeezed states based CQD scheme to provide solutions for the socialist millionaire problem. Here, although we have not discussed it in detail, the proposed scheme can be used in a similar manner. Further, these schemes ensure feasibility of quantum solutions for e-commerce [34] and voting [30] as well. Our CQD scheme can also be reduced to a modified version of recently proposed two-party quantum dialogue [26] scheme in the limiting case, which will be more robust against Gaussian quantum cloning machine and intercept-resend attacks as the squeezing parameter is not revealed in our scheme.
We conclude the paper with the expectation that in view of the recent surge of experimental direct secure quantum communication and promising future of continuous variable quantum communication, the present schemes be implemented in the near future.
